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Abstract
This article reviews the literature on Europeanization beyond the group of EU member,
“quasi-member” and applicant states. It uses the analysis of Europeanization in the applicant
states for membership as a theoretical starting point to ask if, how and under which condi-
tions we can expect domestic effects of European integration beyond Europe. Focusing on
Europeanization effects in the areas of regionalism, democracy and human rights, the article
collects findings on the strategies and instruments as well as the impact and effectiveness of
the EU. The general conclusion to be drawn from the theoretical as well empirical literature
is one of low consistency and impact.
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1 Introduction
At first sight, “Europeanization beyond Europe” seems like an improbable candidate for a litera-
ture review. First, the sceptical reader may ask: “Is there a literature on Europeanization beyond
Europe?” Obviously, the study of Europeanization is largely confined to the impact of European
integration and governance on the member states of the European Union (EU). In addition, a few
studies have expanded the scope of Europeanization analysis to the “quasi-member states”, above
all Norway and Switzerland (e.g. Fischer et al. 2002; Lægreid et al. 2004; Mach et al. 2003; Sciarini
et al. 2004; Sverdrup and Kux 2000). Even more recently, the study of Europeanization has begun
to include the candidate states for EU membership (see the Living Review by Sedelmeier 2006).
But is there any “literature” on “Europeanization beyond Europe”, that is, countries that are not
eligible for membership in the foreseeable future? The editors of a recent compilation of Euro-
peanization research, while positing that the scope of Europeanization is not conceptually limited
to the impact of the EU on its member states, admit that their own handbook is no exception from
this focus (Vink and Graziano 2007: 9, 12). None of its 25 chapters deals with Europeanization be-
yond the accession countries. In addition, a title search in any major literature database combining
the keyword of “Europeanization” with the names of major countries or continents will produce
very little output, and the output it produces is likely to be full of “noise” – articles and books that
are really about the member and candidate states and those that use “Europeanization” in a very
loose and metaphorical sense and with little if any references to the Europeanization literature in
political science studies of the EU.
Second, and more fundamentally, the sceptical reader may argue that the literature fails to
mention “Europeanization” for a good reason and ask: “Is there Europeanization beyond Europe?”
It is certainly plausible to assume that EU organizations, policies, and decisions have a relevant
domestic impact in the member states, in the quasi-member states that participate in the internal
market and in a significant number of other EU policies, and in the candidate states that need to
adopt the acquis communautaire in order to qualify for membership. But can the EU also have a
systematic and distinctive influence beyond Europe?
This is a legitimate question and it has triggered my interest for doing this review. What
does the literature tell us about the EU’s goals and instruments in this area? What are the
“mechanisms” of Europeanization beyond the group of actual and would-be members? To what
extent and under which conditions has the EU been effective in Europeanizing countries beyond
its membership region? A useful comparative starting point for answering these questions is the
state of the art in the neighboring field of the Europeanization of candidate and accession countries
(Sedelmeier 2006).
(1) In the case of quasi-members and candidate countries it is obvious that the transfer of the
acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization. Participation in the highly regulated
single market requires the adoption of its rules; and EU enlargement has always been based on
the principle that new members need to transpose the entire acquis, albeit with certain transition
periods. Beyond the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and the candidate countries,
the content appears less predetermined. So, what is the substance of Europeanization beyond
Europe? Which ideas, norms, rules, organizational structures and procedures, behavioral patterns
etc. spread intentionally or unintentionally beyond the integrated Europe?
(2) Whereas the EU uses the incentive of membership as the main – and overall effective –
lever to make applicant countries adopt its rules (at least formally), this instrument is not available
beyond Europe. Which other instruments and strategies do the EU then have at its disposal? And
can these instruments and strategies be successful in the absence of the membership incentive and
the accession conditionality that often comes with it?
(3) Finally, then, has the EU been able to transfer its rules and practices beyond the confines
of its member and candidate countries? Whereas there is no doubt that a massive transfer of EU
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rules and practices is taking place during the accession phase in countries aspiring to become EU
members, it is far from obvious that countries outside the group of potential member states should
be subject to Europeanization in a similarly pervasive way.
To be sure, there is a growing literature on those EU external policies that are directed towards
or likely to affect the domestic political systems, politics and policies of states beyond Europe. But
“Europeanization” is rarely mentioned in this literature, let alone featured in the titles of books and
articles. Rather, this literature talks about the EU as an international or global actor, as a civilian
or normative power, the EU’s foreign or external policy or policies, or its relations with various
regions of the world. In addition, this literature focuses on what the EU is in the international
system (“actor”, “presence”, or “system”; “civilian”, “trade”, or “normative power”, to name
some of the favorite concepts) and what it does in its external relations (policy decisions, content,
instruments, and strategies) rather than whether and how it affects third countries. What is more,
to the extent that the literature does study the impact of the EU, it concentrates on the impact of
the EU on the international system (e.g. its balance of power) or on specific international regimes
(such as international climate or trade policy). This leaves just a very small part of the literature
studying the domestic impact of the EU beyond Europe – which is the core of the Europeanization
research agenda. This review will therefore be based on a second reading of the relevant portion
of the EU external relations literature, focusing on what we can learn from it for the study of
Europeanization.
As a consequence, this review cannot be organized around seminal books or articles on “Eu-
ropeanization beyond Europe” but needs to start from substantive questions and theoretical per-
spectives to assemble answers that are scattered across the literature. The main body of the review
has four parts. The first introduces theoretical perspectives for studying Europeanization beyond
Europe. The subsequent parts follow the three questions arising from comparing Europeanization
beyond Europe with Europeanization in the accession states: goals and contents; instruments and
strategies; effectiveness and impact. In the final section, I draw a few general conclusions on the
findings of the literature and the future research agenda.
This version of the review will focus on general principles of political order promoted by the
EU (regionalism, democracy, and human rights) and on comparative analyses of Europeanization
beyond Europe. Future updates and revisions of this review will include studies focusing on specific
regions and countries as well as specific EU policies.
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2 Theoretical perspectives
In general, the study of Europeanization beyond Europe could benefit from the entire range of
theoretical approaches that have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization
in the member states (for a brief overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myself to
three theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond the
borders of the EU – but mainly with regard to accession countries. All of them specify mechanisms
of EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are effective, as building blocks
for a theory of Europeanization.
(1) In their analysis of Europeanization in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005a)
distinguish mechanisms of Europeanization according to two dimensions. On the one hand, Eu-
ropeanization can be EU-driven or domestically driven. On the other hand, it can be driven by
different institutional logics, the “logic of consequences” and the “logic of appropriateness” (March
and Olsen 1989: 160-162). First, then, Europeanization can be driven by the EU according to the
logic of consequences, that is by EU sanctions and rewards that change the cost-benefit calculations
of the target state (external incentives model). The impact of external incentives increases with the
size of net benefits and the clarity and credibility of EU conditionality. Second, Europeanization
may be induced by social learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules if they consider
these rules legitimate and if they identify themselves with the EU. Both mechanisms can either
work through intergovernmental interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational
processes via societal actors in the target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 11-12, 18).
Finally, according to the lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction
with the domestic status quo and adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their do-
mestic problems (either based on instrumental calculations or based on the appropriateness of the
EU solutions).
(2) In their study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter,
and Mathias Albert (Diez et al. 2006) also construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize four
“pathways of EU impact”. On the one hand, they distinguish pathways according to “whether
the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an effect of integration processes that are
not directly influenced by EU actors” (Diez et al. 2006: 571). On the other hand, the impact
can be on concrete policies or have wider social implications. The first pathway is “compulsory
impact”, working through concrete measures, namely carrots and sticks, on concrete policies. The
“connective impact” is established through concrete (mainly financial) measures establishing and
supporting contact between the conflict parties. The other pathways work indirectly. According to
the “enabling impact”, conflict actors strengthen their influence by linking their political agendas
and positions to the EU. Finally, the “constructive impact” results in a fundamental reconstruction
of identities as a result of exposure to European integration (Diez et al. 2006: 572-574).
(3) In a recent paper, Michael Bauer, Christoph Knill, and Diana Pitschel (Bauer et al. 2007)
use the trichotomy of EU governance modes in regulatory policy – compliance, competition, and
communication (Knill and Lenschow 2005) – to analyze domestic change in Central and Eastern
Europe. Compliance is a coercive mechanism triggered by legally binding EU rules, which na-
tional administrations must implement in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas compliance is linked
to “positive integration” and the formal harmonization of national rules, competition is related
to “negative integration”, the abolition of national barriers distorting the common market. In
this mode, the impact of the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than
institutional sanctions. “Institutional change is stimulated by the need to improve the functional
effectiveness of member states’ institutional arrangements in comparison to those of other partici-
pants within the common market.” (Bauer et al. 2007, in press) Finally, communication is defined
as a governance mode that brings about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and
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mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than the direct
sanctions of the EU or the indirect sanctions of the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models
that drives Europeanization.
Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations. The classifications
by Diez et al. and Bauer et al. implicitly distinguish between logics of action as well; in contrast to
Bauer et al., Diez et al. and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguish between direct, EU-driven
and indirect pathways of Europeanization; finally, all classifications emphasize that Europeaniza-
tion may work through intergovernmental as well as transnational channels. Table 1 presents an
attempt to map this conceptual overlap. It also shows the empty fields in the three categorizations,
for which I suggest additional concepts.
Table 1: Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the member-states
Intergovernmental Transnational
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Logic of
conse-
quences
(1)
Conditionality
Intergovern-
mental
incentives
Compulsory
impact
Compliance
(2) Lesson-
drawing
Communication
(3) Domestic
empowerment
Transnational
incentives
Connective
impact
Competition
(4) Societal
lesson-drawing
Logic of
appropriate-
ness
(5)
Socialization
Intergovern-
mental social
learning
Constructive
impact
Communication
(6) Imitation
Lesson-drawing
Enabling impact
(7)
Transnational
socialization
Transnational
social learning
(8) Societal
imitation
Enabling impact
The first mechanism of EU impact (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU
on the target government and subsumes the intergovernmental channel of external incentives, the
compulsory impact, and the compliance mode of governance. In EU relations with non-member
states, this mechanism underlies the EU’s strategy of conditionality. In this field, the conceptual
overlap among the three classifications is clearest so that it can serve as a starting point for
discussing the other mechanisms.
The other mechanisms depart in various ways from the reference point of conditionality. Thus,
at a general level, conditionality can be contrasted with lesson-drawing, domestic empowerment,
and socialization. Lesson-drawing (2) is also based on the logic of consequences and on the impact
of the EU on governments. But the impact is indirect, driven by external governments rather than
the EU itself. Under the mode of governance of “communication”, however, lesson-drawing can
also be encouraged by the EU (Bauer et al. 2007).
The mechanism of domestic empowerment (3) works directly but via societal actors or the
anonymous market. The EU provides incentives for societal actors, or triggers processes of com-
petition, which then change the cost-benefit assessments of the target government in the direction
of Europeanization. In addition, societal actors can also draw lessons from the EU (4).
Finally, all of these mechanisms can work through a logic of appropriateness rather than con-
sequences. “Communication” and “social learning” are conceived of as directly sponsored by the
EU in order to trigger processes of persuasion and learning in governments beyond the EU (5).
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Conditionality is often contrasted with socialization along this dimension (Coppieters et al. 2004;
Kelley 2004). Such processes can also be directed at societal actors (7) or driven by external gov-
ernments (6) or societal actors (8). Broadly conceived, “communication” as a mode of governance,
the EU’s “constructive impact”, and “social learning” cover the entire range of mechanisms based
on the logic of appropriateness. The enabling impact more specifically describes the use of the EU
and its policies and solutions by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to
their own political agenda (Diez et al. 2006: 573).
I suggest that these mechanisms could also be used fruitfully to theorize “Europeanization
beyond the EU”. The question then is, under which conditions these mechanisms operate and are
effective beyond the EU’s member and candidate states. None of the three studies generates high
expectations of impact in this regard. According to the analyses in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
(2005b), the impact of the EU in the candidate countries has mainly resulted from the external
incentives of accession conditionality rather than social learning or lesson-drawing. Democratic
conditionality ahead of the accession negotiations has worked best when countries had a credible
promise of eventual membership and when the domestic power costs of adopting democratic and
human rights norms were low, i.e. did not threaten regime survival. Acquis conditionality regarding
the specific rules of the EU began to have major effects only during the accession negotiations.
Diez et al. (2006) find that the “transformative power of integration” in border conflicts is
strongest when all parties to the conflict are EU members, much weaker when they are only
associated to the EU, and even negative when the outer border of the EU coincides with the
contested border. According to Diez et al., this is not only because of conditionality. Membership,
and association to a lesser extent, also increase the legitimacy of EU positions (enabling impact),
support for common activities (connective impact), and exposure to the constructive impact (Diez
et al. 2006: 573-574, 588).
Finally, Bauer et al. (2007), too, generally expect the potential impact of the EU to be higher
in states with good prospects for membership than in “unlikely members”. Again, this not only
applies to the governance mode of compliance (conditionality). Whereas, however, the compliance
mode is expected to have no effect in non-candidate countries, both competition and communication
are hypothesized to have at least a limited effect in the long term to the extent that non-candidate
countries are subject to market pressures generated in the EU and take part in EU-sponsored
policy networks.
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3 Goals and contents
What is the substantive content of Europeanization beyond Europe? Which kinds of domestic
impact does the EU produce either intentionally or unintentionally? In general, Europeanization
covers a broad domain of political impacts across the triad of polity, politics, and policy.
Probably the readiest general characterization of the content of Europeanization beyond Europe
follows from the thesis of “domestic analogy”. According to this thesis, polities prefer to have an
international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and procedures. The
substantive goals – as well as the instruments – thus mirror the fundamental principles of the EU
and European integration (Peters and Wagner 2005: 215-216); Europeanization consists of “the
external projection of internal solutions” (Lavenex 2004: 695).
This general characterization entails various more specific claims regarding the goals that the
EU pursues in the world.
• First, the EU promotes its model of regionalism to other regions. It proposes regional eco-
nomic and market integration and the establishment of supranational organizations as a
pathway to peace and welfare in other parts of the world as well (Bicchi 2006; Farrell 2007).
The regionalist model is also seen in the tendency of the EU to design its policies for, and
conclude agreements with, regional groupings of countries rather than with individual states.
• Second, and often in a more critical perspective, the EU is often seen to disseminate a
“neoliberal” economic model, which reflects the EU’s internal commitment to market-building
and economic liberalization (see, e.g., Hurt 2003, 2004). Others point out, however, that
the EU does not stand for free market policies as such but for a multilaterally managed
“regulatory framework for liberal markets” according to its own model (Grugel 2004: 616;
Woolcock 2005: 396).
• Third, the EU promotes its constitutional norms such as human rights, the rule of law and
democracy in its external relations (e.g. Manners 2002: 240-241). Mirroring the debate
on the economic model promoted by the EU, Gordon Crawford asserts, however, that the
EU promotes a rather limited democracy assistance agenda “oriented at challenging state
power and sustaining economic liberalisation rather than extending popular participation
and control” and thus “consistent with the maintenance of neo-liberal hegemony” (Crawford
2005: 594, 596).
In sum, for the EU as a regionally integrated system of liberal democracies, regionalism, reg-
ulated transnational markets, and democratic constitutionalism define the essence of being “Eu-
ropean”. “Europeanization” then consists in promoting regionally integrated liberal democracies
beyond its borders. In an instrumentally rational perspective, an international environment that
mirrors the EU is likely to be in the interest of the EU and its member states. It is an environment
that they know – and know to use to their benefit. This reduces adaptation and information costs
and gives them an advantage over non-EU actors that are not as familiar with such an environment
(Peters and Wagner 2005: 216). Others, however, emphasize shared values and norms as well as
established routines and templates of the EU as the source of these goals. Federica Bicchi, for
instance, suggests that EU external policy can “be seen as unreflexive behaviour mirroring the
deeply engrained belief that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody. Put briefly, [it] is informed,
at least partially, by the idea that ‘our size fits all”’ (Bicchi 2006: 287). Regional economic inte-
gration and liberal democracy thus represent strong beliefs and universally valid ideas about the
good political order that are promoted regardless of calculations of benefit and feasibility.
The focus on rather general principles of political order in “Europeanization beyond Europe”
may be an artifact of the literature, which has shown a strong interest in the normative content of
EU external policies and the EU as a value-driven actor and “normative power” (e.g. Manners 2002;
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Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006a,b). But it also reflects the EU’s official external relations
doctrine. In addition, it is in line with the findings on Europeanization in the candidate countries
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b): prior to the accession process proper, the focus on and
impact of the EU’s specific acquis rules has been generally weak. Rather, the EU’s constitutive
political norms feature prominently.
Yet the focus on regional integration and liberal democracy also raises some questions. First of
all, what is distinctly “European” in “Europeanization” understood in this way? Whereas it may
be granted that regionalism is a unique feature of EU external relations, democracy, human rights,
and market economy are Western principles that are propagated by non-EU Western countries
(such as the United States) and other international organizations (e.g., the Council of Europe or
the OECD) as well. More than that, the EU itself may have been influenced by broader tendencies
and patterns in the international system. Take, for instance, the “neoliberal” economic order the
EU propagates in its external relations. In this case, the EU is not only part of a larger tendency
represented by most other international economic organizations (Hurt 2004) but its own, internal
economic governance has changed under the impact of “neoliberalism” as well. By the same token,
researchers must be extremely careful in attributing liberal democratic domestic change in third
countries to “Europeanization”. The general problem of Europeanization research – that EU
influences have to be analytically separated from non-EU international and from domestic societal
and political influences – is the more pressing, the less EU-specific the rules under study and the
less dense the institutional relationship between the EU and a third country are.
Second, the arguments about the “domestic analogy” (Peters and Wagner 2005) or the “onto-
logical quality” of the EU as a “changer of norms” (Manners 2002: 252) obviously do not sufficiently
take into account the evolution and changes of the EU’s “Europeanization” goals and strategies
over time. Both arguments suggest that, having been a regional organization of liberal democratic
countries from its very beginnings, the EU should also have engaged in promoting its model right
from the start. Yet the promotion of regionalism, economic liberalism, human rights and democ-
racy has only become prominent since the early 1990s (see below). Rather, the global political
changes of the time (the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization) and the concomi-
tant institutional enhancement of the EU as an international actor (the Common Foreign Security
Policy – CFSP agreed in the Maastricht Treaty) seem to have spurred the explicit definition and
promotion of the EU model beyond Europe (Farrell 2007: 304).
Third, the focus on “nice” and general goals that are officially propagated and intentionally
pursued by the EU may come at the expense of studying the more policy-specific, unintended and
even “nasty” domestic consequences of the EU’s presence in the world. As an effect of the EU’s
market power, for instance, producers and legislators in third countries will often be forced to
unilaterally adopt EU product standards. Consequently, we can observe policy- or issue-specific
Europeanization. Moreover, the effects of the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy on the
welfare as well as societal and political development of less developed countries have arguably been
“nasty” as well as unintended.
In the remainder of the review, I will, however, focus on the general political principles pro-
actively propagated and pursued by the EU. In the next section, the question is how they have
been pursued. Which instruments, strategies, and mechanisms does the literature identify?
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4 Instruments and strategies
The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s have witnessed a major change in EU external
policies: the establishment of conditionality, in particular political conditionality, as a core instru-
ment. Before the 1990s, EU external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and
for the principle not to interfere with the domestic systems of third countries. Since the begin-
nings of the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become “essential
elements” in almost all EU agreements with third countries, as both an objective and a condition
of the institutionalized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the
agreement (Horng 2003). These goals were complemented later by “good governance”.
How did this policy change come about? It would certainly be insufficient to simply attribute
political conditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms of the EU,
which had existed before and did not change at the beginning of the 1990s. Outside the EU,
the changed external political environment after the wave of democratization in 1989/90 was the
major influence. The wave of democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy
of liberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and fledgling democracies. This
was complemented by the increasing acceptance, in development policy circles, that economic aid
and conditionality were insufficient in the absence of political reforms and good governance. Inside
the EU, the European Parliament was the major driving force. It could use the assent procedure
for treaties with third countries, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA),
to press for political conditionality (Holland 2002: 120; Smith 2001).
EU conditionality is generally described as “positive”. It uses “carrots” rather than “sticks” and
is based on rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002: 132; Schimmelfennig 2005;
Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 192). On the one hand, and in spite of the “essential elements” clause,
no agreement with a third country has ever been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs,
“in practice European policy was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures”; the
EU has shown “no notable propensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic
shortfalls”. “European policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality
as more legitimate and potentially more effective” than the use of sticks (Youngs 2001a: 192).
Below the level of treaty relationships, however, the EU did use the “stick”. Financial aid was
withheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed, in several cases (e.g. Nwobike
2005). On the other hand, “there is scant evidence of additional assistance to countries where
things are improving” (Smith 2001: 190).
Conditionality is not the only mechanism of Europeanization observed – not even in the field
of democracy and human rights promotion. In his study of EU democracy promotion in the
Mediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs finds evidence for two rather different strategies:
civil society support and socialization. On the one hand, the “profile of EU democracy assistance
funding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to civil society
support, and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a: 192; Youngs 2001b: 362). This is
also true for Latin America where the EU has little leverage for using political conditionality and
has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004: 612).
On the other hand, “in light of the limits to positive and negative material measures, EU
strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of dialogue and
co-operation as means of socializing political elites into a positive and consensual adherence to
democratic norms”. The EU used “generally accepted cooperation over technical governance is-
sues” in order to promote good governance and democracy indirectly (Youngs 2001a: 193, 195;
2001b: 363). According to Youngs, the socialization approach is designed to create opportunities
for “imitation and demonstration effects” and starts with very modest expectations of introducing
the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites to at least pay lip service
to democracy (Youngs 2001b: 359). It is these strategies rather than political conditionality that
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bear evidence of a distinctive and innovative “European approach” to democracy promotion and
have been “unduly overlooked” (Youngs 2001a: 192, 195). By contrast, the US approach to democ-
racy promotion has been characterized by more “concrete intervention” and a “more top-down,
politicized . . . assistance” focusing on the “formal procedural elements of democracy” (Youngs
2001b: 360, 363-364).
In sum, the Europeanization strategies identified by Youngs in the area of human rights and
democracy competition match the most important mechanisms identified in the theoretical litera-
ture (see section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental) socialization, and direct EU-society
links (via transnational socialization and domestic empowerment). The next question is whether
the literature on Europeanization beyond Europe also confirms the expectation of weak impact.
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5 Impact and Effectiveness
What impact has EU external governance beyond the European member and candidate states?
How and to what extent has it been able to Europeanize non-European countries and regions? In
reviewing the literature, I will again focus on regionalism and democracy/human rights. The two
criteria for evaluating EU policy that are found most often in the literature are consistency and
effectiveness.
5.1 Regionalism
According to Federica Bicchi, the EU has consistently promoted regionalism and followed a regional
approach in its agreements and relations with non-European third countries all over the globe –
with the exception of EU-US bilateral relations (Bicchi 2006: 287-288). This rather consistent
policy across time and space and in spite of regional divergences strongly indicates that it follows
an organizational norm rather than functional considerations. This is particularly evident with
regard to regional policies addressing “regions” that have few objective regional characteristics
(such as high density of transactions) and do not conceive of themselves as regional communities –
such as the “Mediterranean” or the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Rather, they
are constituted as “regions” mainly by EU policy (Bicchi 2006: 288).
As Jean Grugel argues in a comparative analysis of EU and US policy vis-a`-vis Latin Amer-
ica, this regionalism is also distinctively European. First, relations are discursively constructed
as “inter-regional partnerships”, “based around notions of equity and cooperation that ignores
or transcends the underlying power inequalities” (Grugel 2004: 607-608). Second, the EU “has
developed a conscious political leg to its new regionalism”, absent from US-sponsored free-trade as-
sociations, built around “the promotion of its own model of democracy, social welfare, and regional
integration”, understood as subregional integration within Latin America (Grugel 2004: 616).
If the EU’s promotion of regionalism has been consistent and distinctive, has it been isomorphic
as well? That is, have regional arrangements created and supported by the EU been modeled on
the EU example and have they been similar to each other? First, the great variety of interregional
cooperation arrangements seems to contradict the expectation of isomorphism (for an overview,
see Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). Second, there seems to be disagreement with regard to
the assessment of specific arrangements. For instance, whereas Bicchi argues that the institutional
settings and governance regimes of the EU and its Mediterranean policy (EMP) are highly similar
to international governance with regard to its multilateral institutional framework, the emphasis
on “economic matters but with a social flavour”, and the “eurocentric” transfer of the Justice and
Home Affairs agenda to the EMP (Bicchi 2006: 295-298), Joffe´ (2001) and Alecu de Flers and
Regelsberger (2005: 323) point to the fact that the Barcelona process has been modeled on the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) rather than on the EU’s own set-up.
The region that the EU seems to regard as most promising with regard to isomorphic regionalism
is Latin America (in particular its Southern Cone), which is the culturally most similar world region
and one which has a common market project (Mercosur) that might develop along European lines
(Grugel 2004: 616). Here, the EU seeks to spread its ideas of regional integration and good
governance through “research funding, seminar programmes, and the creation of a fund to provide
for the regular exchange of ideas within Latin America, in imitation of its own policies” (Grugel
2004: 612).
Interestingly, however, it is the African Union (AU – designed in 2000) that mirrors the EU
most closely in institutional terms – with its Parliament, Commission, Executive Council of Min-
isters, Court of Justice, and plans for a common currency. The use of the EU template in this case
seems to have been a case of lesson-drawing or imitation rather than EU conditionality or social-
ization. However, the apparently supranational set-up of the AU is not matched by supranational
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competences for these institutions (Farrell 2007: 312).
Unintended effects of the EU’s presence rather than the impact of the intentional promotion
of regionalism seem to have occurred in other regions or sub-regions as well. Christopher Hill and
Michael Smith point out that “the need to deal with a rich and powerful EU draws other states into
cooperative ventures, especially in their international relations” (Hill and Smith 2005: 396, their
italics) and list the South African Development Committee as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM) as examples. Whereas, however, the EU might have unintentionally triggered regional
cooperation in these cases, the cooperation schemes did not follow the EU model of regionalism.
Both Thomas Christiansen et al. (2000) and Anne Myrjord (2003) point out the ambivalent
effects of the EU on regional institutions and region-building in the adjacent regions. On the one
hand, EU neighborhood policies have reduced the divisive effects of enlargement and “minimized
the importance of the institutional boundary between the Union and its environment”. They
represent “a turn towards an inclusive form of conducting EU external policy” and give non-
member countries a say in EU policy-making (Myrjord 2003: 251; see also Christiansen et al. 2000:
412). On the other hand, however, the often bilateral framework of negotiations between the EU
and third states tends to undermine the model of multilateral regional integration that the EU seeks
to promote, and external governance arrangements can only partially offset the disruptive effects
of the EU’s differentiation between members, candidates, and non-candidates in its neighboring
regions (Christiansen et al. 2000: 407, 412). This finding is supported in the study by Diez et al.
(2006), which claims that EU borders that coincide with existing border conflicts exacerbate rather
than mitigate these conflicts.
In addition, “an emerging dependence on relatively strong EU financial instruments carries the
potential of crowding out existing regional initiatives” (Myrjord 2003: 252). This effect will, of
course, depend on the existence and strength of endogenous region-building developments. Whereas
in the Baltic and Nordic regions, where such region-building efforts seem to have been relatively
well developed, the EU may have had an overall disruptive effect, in the Mediterranean, “even
the limited efforts of the EU to generate multilateralism constitute the main driving force in an
externally directed region-building effort” (Christiansen et al. 2000: 412).
With regard to Africa, Hurt is equally sceptical: “The history of regional integration projects
within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one of consistent failure to achieve meaningful inte-
gration and development.” Moreover, the six new regions defined in the Cotonou Agreement1 of
2002 are “externally imposed and do not in most cases correspond to existing regional organiza-
tions” (Hurt 2003: 173).
In sum, the promotion of regionalism has indeed been a consistent and distinctive feature of
EU external relations. In addition, the presence of the EU, its success in regional integration, and
its importance as an economic actor have served as a model and triggered regional cooperation
schemes in other parts of the world. Both conditionality and lesson-drawing/imitation seem to
have been at work in these processes. Yet the scope and design of these schemes are extremely
diverse and bear at best superficial resemblance to the EU. In addition, the actual policy of the EU
toward and in these regional arrangements seems at times to undermine rather than strengthening
regionalism beyond the EU.
5.2 Human rights and democracy
Just as Bicchi (2006) for the case of regionalism, Tanja Bo¨rzel and Thomas Risse argue in a
recent paper that “the instruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the
rule of law, and ‘good governance’ look surprisingly similar across the globe”, indicating that “the
EU follows quite clearly a specific cultural script” (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2004: 2). The use of political
1 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lome´ Convention as the general treaty framework between the EU and
the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. Its focus is on development policy.
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conditionality, political dialogue and capacity-building mechanisms in all world regions demonstrate
movement “towards a coherent approach”, which did not follow a grand design, however, but
“incremental ‘learning by doing’” (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2004: 28-29). Yet, Bo¨rzel and Risse avowedly
do not analyze the implementation of the EU’s approach nor its effectiveness on the ground. When
these are taken into account, the picture of consistency quickly becomes blurred.
The consistency of EU political conditionality is one of the central issues addressed in the
literature and the general finding is “not consistent”. Inconsistency starts with the fact that
“essential-elements” clauses are not included in agreements with China and the ASEAN countries
as well as with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Whereas in the latter cases, this may be
attributed to stable democracy, this excuse clearly does not apply to the Asian countries.
Authors generally observe that the EU treats countries differently even though their human
rights record is similar (or the other way around). Despite the pervasive political and legal rhetoric
of democracy and human rights promotion, actual policy seems to match rhetoric only when
consistency is “cheap”; otherwise, it is driven by a host of other – geopolitical, economic or security
– interests. According to Karen Smith, “poor, marginal states (often in Africa) of little importance
to the EU or one of its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the
cases where it is easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights” (Smith 2001:
193). In other cases, member states block suspension or termination because this would harm their
commercial interests, because the country is strategically or politically too important, or because
they have doubts about the effectiveness of negative measures (Smith 2001: 196). Overriding
interest in cooperation on energy and the war on terror is also cited as the main reason why
democracy promotion was not prioritized in Central Asia despite the dismal political record of the
region (Warkotsch 2006). Martin Holland reports that suspensions have mainly hit participants in
the Lome´ Convention and countries that were economically relatively unimportant to the EU; on
the other hand, the EU spared Asian and economically more relevant countries (Holland 2002: 133).
In conclusion, he argues that, whereas the “link between development and democratic principles of
good government has become the accepted and inevitable face of North-South relations; the degree
to which this conditionality is supervised and sanctioned remains variable, almost idiosyncratic”
(Holland 2002: 135).
Richard Youngs also generally finds that the “the overall distribution of EU trade and aid
provisions did not to any significant extent correlate with democratic criteria” and punishment as
well as rewards “were adopted on an ad hoc basis and not pursued with any coherence or vigour”
(Youngs 2001b: 357). He also observes that the EU has reacted more to massive human rights
abuses and “dramatic interruptions of the democratic process” than to persistently autocratic
governments. “Democratic conditionality has not been systematic.” (Youngs 2001b: 356)
In a statistical analysis of the suspension of development cooperation in reaction to human rights
violations, Hadewych Hazelzet comes to more nuanced results. On the one hand, her findings that
“the level of respect for human rights or regime type was not significant for the granting of EU
development cooperation” and that the EU was less likely “to impose sanctions on countries with
which it has institutionalised cooperation” confirm the general picture of inconsistency (Hazelzet
2005: 9-10). She also finds that former French or British colonies were sanctioned less severely than
former colonies of other EU member states, indicating the protective influence of these member
states (Hazelzet 2005: 10). On the whole, however, her multivariate regression analysis “indicates
that, in the 1990s, overall the level of human rights violations was a more important determinant
for EU sanctions than the level of economic or strategic importance of a country” (Hazelzet 2005:
11). However, Hazelzet’s findings refer to ACP countries only. As other authors have pointed out
(see above), this group of countries was of relatively minor economic and strategic importance to
the EU and was thus more likely to be treated consistently than the Asian countries.
The inconsistency differs markedly from the fairly consistent and meritocratic use of political
conditionality vis-a`-vis the accession countries (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 2003: 99-108; Vachudova´
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2005). The variation in institutional set-up may be one cause for this difference in consistency.
In the accession cases, political assessments and decisions are prepared by the Commission in
a centralized way; beyond the applicant countries, member state governments and the different
pillars of the EU are more strongly involved (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 28-46). Alternatively,
the difference can be explained by a “community effect: when constitutional questions such as
membership are at stake, the pressure to act in line with the constitutive community rules increases.
Rule adoption is expedient for outside cooperation partners but indispensable for future members.
Whereas interest-based considerations are permitted to take the upper hand in relations with
external states, the constitutive community rules will prevail in relations with future insiders”
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 46).
Beyond Europe, the move toward intergovernmental political conditionality thus seems to have
been declaratory rather than practical policy. If the EU’s political conditionality has been in-
consistent beyond Europe, what about its policies of domestic empowerment and socialization?
According to Richard Youngs, the EU did not pursue these strategies consistently either. As to
civil society assistance, “the EU did not push hard to gain access for political aid work” and was
“unwilling to risk tension with recipient governments”; and in its dialogue and cooperation, “the
EU often deliberately sought ways of circumventing its own formal preconditions, offering con-
crete sectoral cooperation without the need for a formalization of new democracy-based discourse”
(Youngs 2001a: 193; see also Youngs 2001b: 365). Thus, it seems to be a general feature of EU
democracy promotion that it has been, as several authors have put it, “high on rhetoric and low
on policy” (Crawford 2005 on Ghana; Warkotsch 2006 on Central Asia).
Elsewhere, Richard Youngs (2004) uses the case of EU human rights promotion in order to make
a general point about the interaction of norms and strategic interests in EU external relations. He
argues that “instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings”
and, in particular, that “security-driven choices [have] been selected within the overarching human
rights framework” (Youngs 2004: 431). In his analysis, EU human rights policy has been attuned
to the general promotion of international stability and exhibited a “state-oriented capacity-building
bias” (Youngs 2004: 424).
There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency of EU strategy
but also on the overall low impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in non-candidate
third countries. This finding holds regardless of the region under study and the strategy used.
The causes of ineffectiveness appear rather overdetermined for political conditionality. First, vis-
a`-vis non-candidate countries the EU cannot use its most important incentive for compliance: the
prospect of membership. Second, inconsistency hampers effectiveness: the “seemingly variable
application of conditionality . . . detracts from the EU’s international credibility and influence”
(Holland 2002: 135). Third, for the mostly authoritarian or autocratic governments in the EU’s
neighboring regions, compliance with the EU’s democratic or human rights standards is politically
costly. It involves the risks of losing political power that, in the perception of the third-country
governments are not offset by whatever economic or diplomatic rewards the EU has on offer. The
indirect strategies were confronted with the same obstacle when the ruling elites in the target states
“perceived that the good governance agenda was elaborated with increasingly political intent”
(Youngs 2001a: 195; see also Tanner 2004: 140-141).
In sum, EU democracy promotion and human rights policy beyond Europe has used the three
mechanisms of conditionality, socialization, and domestic empowerment. In all of these cases,
however, it is characterized by low consistency and effectiveness.
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6 Conclusions
In the introductory sections of the review, I proposed to use the literature on Europeanization in
the candidate states for membership as a benchmark for the analysis of “Europeanization beyond
Europe”. In general, the findings reported here suggest that the dividing line between the candidate
states for EU membership and other third countries also constitutes a categorical difference for the
analysis of Europeanization effects.
First, whereas in the case of “quasi-members” and candidate countries, the acquis communau-
taire is at the core of Europeanization, the goals and contents of Europeanization beyond Europe,
at least those analyzed in most of the literature, are of a more general character. Whereas “re-
gionalism” may still count as an EU-specific goal, which – if effectively pursued – would result in
a distinctive “Europeanization” beyond Europe, other core goals such as stability and security or
democracy and human rights are clearly less related to the EU’s acquis and less specific to the
external relations of the EU.
Second, whereas positive political conditionality has become a general feature of EU relations
with third countries in the 1990s, it has been used less consistently than in EU relations with
potential future member states. Moreover, other instruments for promoting EU core values and
norms – such as domestic empowerment of civil society or socialization through transgovernmental
cooperation – while described as unique EU strategies, do not appear to have been consistent and
effective substitutes for political accession conditionality.
Third, the Europeanizing impact of these strategies has been weak beyond the group of credible
candidates for EU membership. The causes for the weak impact are probably manifold: low
incentives and low consistency of policy on the part of the EU and serious domestic obstacles to
Europeanization on the part of third countries. In sum, membership or the prospect of membership
appears to be a crucial condition of Europeanization. With regard to its specific normative and
regulatory content, its instruments and its impact, Europeanization beyond Europe is substantially
weaker than Europeanization in Europe. This need not be the last word on the issue, though.
1) Whereas the literature conveys the picture that Europeanization efforts beyond Europe are
inconsistent and ineffective overall, this does not mean that there are no cases of consistent pol-
icy and effective impact. Searching for such cases and studying their conditions in comparison
with similar cases may generate better knowledge on the differential effects and the conditions
of Europeanization in non-candidate countries. In general, we would need carefully designed and
theory-guided comparative studies, which directly address and assess the causality question be-
tween EU policies and domestic change.
2) Whereas the general Europeanization literature focuses very much on policies, policy-making
processes and administrative structures, the literature reviewed here was about polity: regional
integration and constitutional structure. Maybe this is the wrong place to look for Europeanization
effects beyond Europe. Studies mirroring the general focus on policy and politics (related to policy-
making) might find a stronger impact of “Europe” on third countries.
Such a research agenda would require, however, that the literature on EU external policies
make “Europeanization” an explicit focus of its work, which it has not done so far. This includes
importing theories and hypotheses as well as mechanisms and conditions from the general Euro-
peanization literature. It would also require coping with the problems of establishing causality
that haunt the study of Europeanization in general. Finally, since Europeanization ultimately
needs to be studied in the target countries, analyzing “Europeanization beyond Europe” requires
researchers to go “beyond Europe” as well, acquire local expertise, and do research far away from
Brussels.
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